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To combat the epidemic of youth gun violence
in the 1980s and 1990s, law enforcement
agencies across the United States adopted a
variety of innovative strategies. This article
presents case studies of eight cities’ efforts to
police gun crime. Some cities emphasized
police–citizen partnerships to address youth
violence, whereas others focused on aggressive
enforcement against youth suspected of even
minor criminal activity. Still others attempted
to change youth behavior through “soft”
strategies built on alternatives to arrest. Finally,
some cities used a combination of approaches.
Key findings discussed in this article include:
◗ Law enforcement agencies that empha-
sized police–citizen cooperation benefited
from a more positive image and sense of
legitimacy in the community, which may
have enhanced their efforts to fight crime.
◗ Aggressive law enforcement strategies may
have contributed to a decline in youth gun
violence, but they also may have cost
police legitimacy in minority communities
where residents felt that the tactics were
unfair or racially motivated.
◗ Approaches that emphasize nonarrest
alternatives and problem-solving strategies
offer an intriguing but unproven vision for
addressing youth gun violence.
None of the initiatives presented in the case
studies has been shown conclusively to
reduce youth gun crime over the long 
term. The author suggests that policing
alone cannot contain youth gun violence,
but by carefully balancing enforcement with
community collaboration, police depart-
ments can help shift social norms that con-
tribute to youth gun violence.
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., is professor of law and public
health at Columbia University Law School.
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The epidemic of youth gun violence in theUnited States from 1985 to 1998 triggereda crisis of social and political consequencesthat mobilized legal institutions to develop
effective policies and programs targeting youth vio-
lence.1 Even before this most recent homicide crisis,
however, numerous experiments and innovations in
policing had been taking place in cities across the Unit-
ed States; some of these were quickly adapted in the
effort to combat youth gun violence.2 Under the flag
of “community policing,” “problem-oriented polic-
ing,” and “order-maintenance policing,” police depart-
ments launched a variety of new approaches to chronic
problems of crime and disorder. Youth gun violence
was often the focus of these reforms and experiments.
These initiatives ranged from intensive and aggressive
street-level interdiction of low-level disorder to new
forms of neighborhood–police partnerships, often called
“community policing.”3 Several of these efforts were
designed in response to an influential essay on “Broken
Windows,” which described the contagious effects of dis-
order on crime.4 (See Box 1 later in this article.) Other
programs focused on specific individuals and high-crime
neighborhoods.5 Still others sought to expand the tool-
kit of police to include solving social problems through
interaction and collaboration with citizens.6 In these
strategies, police focused their efforts on issues that con-
cerned residents the most, while motivating citizen coop-
eration in the everyday policing of crime.
This article presents eight case studies (see Table 1) of
cities where policing innovations were targeted at gun
violence. It summarizes the underlying conceptual
framework of each effort and describes both its strate-
gies and its specific focus on youth violence.7 Evalua-
tion data are limited, but when available, the results of
each initiative are reported. These case studies suggest
three different approaches to strengthening social con-
trol to reduce youth gun violence:
◗ Reciprocal Control. Cities that adopted this approach
to policing gun violence, including Boston, Chicago,
and San Diego, aimed to make the crime-control
activities of police and community groups mutually
reinforcing. Power-sharing arrangements evolved
between police and citizens through a process of
problem solving and collective decision making.
◗ Punitive Legal Control. The punitive approach
focused on deterring gun violence through vigorous
law enforcement. New York City emphasized aggres-
sive street-level enforcement to detect and remove
guns through intensive surveillance and high arrest
rates. Project Exile in Richmond pursued aggressive
prosecution strategies against gun offenders. In these
cases, citizens were often excluded from the process
of designing strategy, and citizen perspectives were of
secondary importance in setting policy.
◗ “Soft” Legal Control. This approach emphasized
community-driven, nonarrest methods to reduce
youth gun crime. The Firearm Suppression Program
in St. Louis implemented voluntary searches of
homes where juveniles were suspected of keeping
weapons. In Detroit, the juvenile courts adopted a
therapeutic, rather than a punitive, approach to
encouraging juvenile gun offenders to put down
their weapons. Police collaboration with mental
health professionals to address gun-related trauma in
New Haven also featured the systematic use of
nonarrest alternatives to prevent youth gun violence.
These efforts helped to mitigate cultural and social
barriers between police and citizens.
In several cities, these social control strategies over-
lapped. Cities such as Boston and Chicago, for exam-
ple, used both reciprocal and punitive policing
strategies. They incorporated both community involve-
ment and intensive surveillance, and enforcement
focused on high-risk offenders in specific neighbor-
hoods. Similarly, well-publicized innovations in com-
munity policing in San Diego were credited with the
lion’s share of that city’s reduction in violence through
the 1990s and were offered as a positive contrast to
New York City’s aggressive model.8 But intensive
enforcement efforts targeted at street gangs and drug
traffickers were also a focus in San Diego throughout
this period.9
The innovations in police responses to youth gun vio-
lence described in this article reflect diverse theories
not just of organizational change, but also of how citi-
zens and police might interact to produce security and
social control. As these case studies illustrate,
police–citizen interactions can influence the course of
youth gun violence outbreaks.
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Targeted young gang members and other offend-
ers; deterred illegal activity by informing potential
offenders that even minor infractions would result
in a massive police response; worked with
churches to create legitimacy for police efforts.
Created citizen councils to advise each police dis-
trict; held monthly meetings with citizens in each
police “beat”; coincided with aggressive police
enforcement of anti-loitering ordinance aimed at
gang members.
Incorporated extensive community involvement
into policing; supported Neighborhood Watch pro-
grams; collaborated with community organiza-
tions to clean up properties that attracted criminal
activity; trained volunteers in crime prevention;
assigned police officers to schools to work on
community-identified problems.
Aggressively enforced laws against social disor-
der with frequent use of “stop-and-frisk” tactics
to identify lawbreakers, and with mandatory
arrest for even low-level crimes.
Prosecuted all gun-related arrests made by state
and local authorities in federal court, where
penalties are often more serious.
With parental consent, searched homes and con-
fiscated illegal weapons from juveniles; did not
charge parents who allowed searches with illegal
firearm possession.
Required youth gun offenders to attend a class
that emphasized the danger of handguns and the
importance of personal responsibility in reducing
gun violence.
Trained police officers in mental health and child
development to help children who were victims or
witnesses of gun violence cope with trauma.
Table 1
Police Approaches to Curbing Youth and/or Gun Violence
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Reciprocal Control: Boston, Chicago,
and San Diego
Throughout the 1990s, police departments in Boston,
Chicago, and San Diego focused heavily on citizen
involvement as a way to reduce youth gun violence. In
each of these communities, increased collaboration
between citizens and the police may have increased the
legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the community.
Although the mechanisms for citizen participation var-
ied from city to city, a common thread was cooperation
between citizens and police in developing solutions to
the problems that contributed to youth violence.
The Boston Gun Project
In Boston, police sought to combat youth gun vio-
lence by deterring gang members from engaging in
illegal activity. The Boston strategy also incorporated
extensive outreach to religious and community leaders
in the African American, inner-city neighborhoods
where most youth gun violence was taking place. The
Boston Gun Project helped to increase legitimacy for
the police department in communities that have his-
torically mistrusted the police, but this process remains
far from complete.
Two distinct and contrasting narratives comprise the
Boston story. In one, the Boston Police Department
formed an interagency working group, composed of
Harvard University researchers, the police depart-
ment, and other criminal justice agencies, to collabo-
rate on research and analysis of the city’s youth
violence problem. The work of this group showed that
the problem was concentrated among a small group of
high-rate offenders who were deeply involved in
Boston’s youth gangs.5
In response, the working group developed a strategy
called “pulling levers,” which employed a deterrence
model to curb youth violence. Police and probation
officers communicated directly to gang members that
any wrongdoing would be met with swift and immedi-
ate sanctions, including arrest and prosecution for even
small infractions as well as the quick revocation of pro-
bation or parole for either minor or major violations.
The project deterred youth gun violence both by mak-
ing good on the promise of strong legal reactions to
any crime and by saturating neighborhoods with this
message via fliers, street work with individual gang
members, and group interactions with agency staff
from the probation department.10
By generalizing deterrence throughout gangs, not
just for a few members whose violence had captured
the attention of probation and police officers, the ini-
tiative sought to create a shift in norms within
Boston’s youth gangs, encouraging gang members to
restrain each other from violent activity. Because the
actions of one gang member would trigger a crack-
down by police and probation staff on all members of
that gang, gangs had a powerful incentive to rein in
violent members. 
The second narrative in the Boston story was the con-
struction of an “umbrella of legitimacy” that permitted
a reconciliation of the interests of the police and the
inner-city community that was the focus of the Boston
Gun Project.11 The racialized political climate in
Boston—going back to the city’s school desegregation
conflict and a series of scandals over unfair police treat-
ment of African American males—made it necessary to
establish a new climate in which inner-city citizens
could embrace and participate in police efforts.12 The
Boston Gun Project sought to build legitimacy for
police efforts to end youth gun violence through close
interaction with the Ten Point Coalition, a group of
Boston ministers from 40 inner-city churches.11,13 The
partnership made sense because the Ten Point Coali-
tion and Boston’s law enforcement agencies had recip-
rocal and aligned goals.11 Active offenders had
undermined the ministers’ efforts to reach high-risk
youth, while the police needed acceptance by residents
of Boston’s inner-city neighborhoods to succeed in
their surveillance efforts.
The Coalition engaged with law enforcement agencies
to instill community norms opposing violence. The
Coalition retained its credibility in the community by
maintaining its independence from the police—even
criticizing the police—while at the same time working
with the police to reach out to at-risk or criminally
active youth. Through its contacts with citizens and
adolescents, the Coalition has continued to show its
disapproval for violence and its desire to keep other
youth out of trouble.11,14
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Although the Boston police can now operate in the slip-
stream of the Coalition’s efforts, legitimacy continues to
be an elusive goal for them. According to ethnographic
research in Boston’s inner-city communities, citizens
now view the police as competently and dependably
enforcing law in their neighborhoods, but they also feel
that the police show “disrespect,”15 targeting their chil-
dren for policing and conveying the impression that
police efforts are designed to control community resi-
dents and protect “others.”15 Residents reported that
fair and respectful treatment was important to their rat-
ings of their security and was a factor that motivated or
impeded their compliance with police and with the law.16
The prospects for long-term success from this unique
collaboration of churches and the law may lie in the
extent to which reciprocal interests and mutual respect
are sustained between citizens and police.
Did the Boston Gun Project reduce youth firearm
homicide rates more effectively than efforts in other
Massachusetts cities? Figure 1 shows that firearm homi-
cides of persons under age 25 declined sharply follow-
ing the launch of the Boston Gun Project in June 1996
and continued to decline through 1997 before rising
again in 1998. However, youth gun homicides in
Boston had begun declining in 1995, the year preced-
ing the Boston Gun Project. Also, youth gun homicides
declined in other Massachusetts cities during this same
period. In cities with populations from 75,000 to
175,000, youth gun homicide victimization rates had
declined nearly 75% by 1998, compared to a 50%
decline in Boston. The declines in Boston thus seem to
have been part of a larger statewide downward trend in
youth gun violence. Moreover, homicides in Boston
have continued to rise since 1998.
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Figure 1
Firearm Homicide Victimization Rate, Ages 0 to 24
Source: Massachusetts Department of Health, Weapon-Related Injury Surveillance System (WRISS); Massachusetts Institute
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The future of the Boston Gun Project is uncertain. The
Coalition of police and clergy faces new problems,
including an economy in recession, a return of youth
gun violence, and a large cohort of newly released pris-
oners returning to Boston’s inner city. How past suc-
cesses evolve to meet these new challenges will be a
critical test of the validity of the Boston strategy.
Chicago’s Community Policing Experiment
Similar to Boston’s experience, two narratives unfold-
ed in Chicago. One exemplified “community polic-
ing”: police–community interactions to reduce crime
and support social control. The other incorporated
proactive policing of high-risk juvenile and young adult
gang members. Although these two approaches to
policing were not targeted specifically at youth, they
affected policing of youth crime and adolescent gun
violence significantly. The two approaches reflected
very different visions about the role of citizens in con-
trolling crime and the possibilities for police–citizen
collaboration in the coproduction of security.
Known as the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, or
CAPS, the community policing experiment structured
systematic citizen–community interactions at the beat
and district levels. Chicago is divided into 26 police
districts, which are further divided into 279 beats, each
delineating the patrol area of one squad car.17 Begin-
ning in January 1993, the first of five prototype dis-
tricts began implementing CAPS. The prototype
districts stressed “beat integrity,” which meant that
officers focused service on their patrol areas. They did
not patrol areas outside their beat; individuals were
assigned to particular beats for sustained periods;
police officers knew the problems and residents of their
beats; and residents got to know them.
At monthly meetings in each beat, police met with res-
idents to jointly identify and strategize about the most
urgent problems of crime and disorder in their neigh-
borhoods.18 Each district also created an advisory body
of community leaders to represent larger concerns to
the district’s commander. The prototype program was
hailed as a success and expanded to cover the entire city
beginning in fall 1994.17 Approximately 80,000 people
attended beat meetings during 1995 and the first four
months of 1996.19
CAPS was an experiment not just in community polic-
ing, but also in democracy.20 By creating a new demo-
cratic deliberative forum, in which agencies and
citizens worked together to set enforcement priorities,
CAPS offered the promise of accountability of police
to citizens. Participation by residents in beat meetings
and district advisory councils varied by neighborhood
and over time, however.21 A study of 15 of the 279
police beats found uneven implementation of the
CAPS strategy: Four beats were doing well, five
showed some successes in implementation, two were
“struggling,” and four had done nothing at all.22 The
study attributed the variation to individual differences
in the officers assigned to CAPS functions.
Even so, citizens reacted positively to the CAPS efforts.
A U.S. Department of Justice survey reported that near-
ly three in four Chicago residents were familiar with the
term “community policing,” two in three stated that the
police were actually doing “community policing,” and
two in five had heard about the monthly beat meetings.23
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As the CAPS experiment was unfolding, another police
initiative sought to eliminate gang activity in Chicago’s
most troubled neighborhoods. Chicago’s May 1992
Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibited “criminal
street gang members”24 from loitering in public
places.25 Under the ordinance, police officers could
order the dispersal of two or more persons loitering in
a public place if the officers reasonably believed that at
least one of the persons was a gang member. Failure to
promptly obey such an order was a violation of the
ordinance and could result in arrest.
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court found the Gang
Congregation Ordinance to be unconstitutional,26 but
only after nearly 40,000 persons had been arrested.27 A
1995 study of two of Chicago’s 26 police districts esti-
mated that 27% of the African American male youth
population had been arrested under the ordinance in
one district, and 34% in the other.28 Nor did the ordi-
nance appear to have the desired effect of reducing
crime. While it was in effect from 1992 to 1995, mur-
ders rose by 2.9% in the three districts with the highest
arrest rates, but declined by 54.5% in the three districts
with the lowest arrest rates.28
In 2000, a revised ordinance was adopted that addressed
the U.S. Supreme Court’s criticisms. The revised ordi-
nance more carefully spells out the circumstances under
which police officers can issue an order to disperse, and
it more narrowly defines suspicious behaviors that war-
rant police attention. It remains in effect today.
Some argue that the Gang Congregation Ordinance
reflected the wishes of community members who were
victims of gang violence and could not participate in
everyday social regulation of neighborhood activities
because of fears for their safety.29 Others argued that
the initiative discriminated against youth in minority
communities and gave broad, unregulated power to
the police to detain and arrest young people. The strat-
egy of aggressive enforcement of a vague law under-
mined the legitimacy of policing through its broad
reach to intervene in behavior at the very lowest
thresholds of criminal law violation.30 Safety is only one
dimension on which citizens evaluate police actions,
and fair treatment may perhaps be a more important
factor.31 In this algebra, it is unlikely that policies like
the Gang Congregation Ordinance can produce legit-
imacy and promote compliance with the law among
inner-city residents, even if they may promote safety.
Despite these concerns, the Gang Congregation Ordi-
nance appears to reflect the future of policing in Chica-
go. In 2001, Chicago recorded 666 homicides, its first
increase since 1994 and the highest total of any city in
the nation. Concerned over rising homicide rates,
police officials have shifted their strategy to concentrate
on the gang problems that drive Chicago’s homicides,
using aggressive street-level enforcement techniques
sanctioned by the ordinance. It remains to be seen
whether the CAPS style of police–citizen cooperation in
crime control can coexist with this aggressive form of
policing—or whether CAPS will be eclipsed entirely.32
Neighborhood Policing in San Diego: 
The Coproduction of Security
Police officials in San Diego adopted the theory and
operating principles of community policing, structur-
ing police–citizen interactions to strengthen informal
social control and prevent crime. Efforts to reduce
youth gun violence were a key part of their strategy,
but the police focused on prevention, using arrest only
after other approaches failed.
San Diego began a community-policing experiment,
the Neighborhood Policing Philosophy, in the late
1980s. In 1993, the department was reorganized, and
the entire force retrained to implement community
policing.8 The San Diego reform was focused not on
specific crime problems such as gun violence or youth
crime, but instead on the creation of a systemic process
of police–citizen interactions to maximize social con-
trol. The result was a reciprocal process, with police
and citizens closely aligned in pursuit of shared goals.
The San Diego Police Department’s strategy included
sharing information with citizens for analysis of crime
problems, forming partnerships with community groups
to address problems that motivate or facilitate crime, and
emphasizing routine, noncoercive police contacts with
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citizens to share responsibility for crime prevention and
control. This approach shifted the police department’s
emphasis from traditional surveillance–investigation–
apprehension to identification and remediation of the
social and physical conditions that facilitate crime.
Partnerships between the police and citizens were
forged among elites in government, labor, education,
and citizen groups, and were replicated at the local
level. A steering committee was formed in 1993 to
guide the reform, and at the same time, community
advisory boards were formed, mirroring the larger
group. The San Diego Organizing Project, a citywide
advocacy group, provided leadership to legitimize the
collaboration with the police.
The neighborhood policing strategy in San Diego
included the common elements of community policing
elsewhere: (1) support for “neighborhood watch” and
citizen patrol groups to look for suspicious activity,
identify community problems, and work on crime-pre-
vention projects; (2) use of civil remedies and strict
building code enforcement to abate nuisances such as
drug markets or drug-use locations; and (3) collabora-
tion with community organizations and local business
groups to clean up, close down, or redesign locations
and properties that repeatedly attracted prostitution,
drug, and gang problems.9
What set the San Diego reform apart from other com-
munity policing efforts was the role embraced by
organized neighborhood volunteers. The San Diego
Police Department recruited and trained a pool of more
than 1,000 citizen volunteers to perform a broad array
of crime-prevention and victim-assistance services.
Accordingly, the San Diego experiment integrated
community policing with community participation.9
Specific efforts to reduce youth gun violence in San
Diego began in 1997 with the formation of a task force
of 200 people, including representatives from police,
probation, schools, the juvenile court, parents, com-
munity advisory boards, and nonprofit groups. The
task force created juvenile service teams, with officers
placed in schools to focus on needs identified by the
community advisory boards. The teams referred youth
at risk of gun violence to local service providers. In
addition, a gang-suppression team focused on the city’s
estimated 5,000 gang members, who were involved in
a large share of youth gun injuries, and a narcotics task
force focused on violence in drug markets.
These teams pursued a crime-prevention strategy based
on community perspectives that arrests failed to offer
long-term solutions to youth gun violence.9 Similar to
the Ten Point Coalition and the Boston Gun Project,
the teams placed a wide net of social control over youth
before they became involved with gun violence. Legal
sanctions were used as a last resort to address problems
that had failed to respond to other nonarrest solutions.
The San Diego effort has not been fully evaluated, but
it offers a compelling vision of how a police department
can fully involve its citizens in making communities
safer. Extensive community participation and the police
department’s nonpunitive approaches toward reducing
youth gun violence spared San Diego much of the ill
will and mistrust spawned by aggressive policing tactics
in New York City—the next focus of this article.
Punitive Legal Control: 
New York City and Richmond
The punitive approach aims to deter youth gun violence
through aggressive law enforcement against all offend-
ers, even those who have committed low-level crimes.
Although both Boston and Chicago included punitive
components in their law enforcement strategies, they
also used other tools to combat gun violence. In con-
trast, New York City and Richmond relied primarily on
punitive strategies. In both cities, rates of gun violence
fell precipitously, with punitive strategies getting much
of the credit for the drop. However, because these
strategies fail to involve the community or change the
dynamics of citizen participation in crime control, puni-
tive approaches do not hold the promise of reducing
youth gun violence in the long term.
Order-Maintenance Policing in New York City
Beginning in 1994, New York City police officials
redesigned crime-control strategies to focus on two
related problems: (1) social and physical disorder and
(2) gun violence. The police adopted a strategy known
as “order-maintenance policing” (OMP), which
focused on fighting crime by targeting low-level disor-
der. The New York Police Department (NYPD)
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cracked down on low-level crime through aggressive
enforcement measures; hundreds of thousands of New
Yorkers—including large numbers of adolescents—
were subject to stop-and-frisk actions under this policy.
The OMP approach was credited with significant
declines in gun violence in New York City in the mid-
to late 1990s. But this success came at a price:
increased community mistrust of police and percep-
tions that the police were engaging in racial profiling.
New York City’s OMP strategy derived from what has
become popularly known as Broken Windows theo-
ry.33,34 (See Box 1.) Under OMP, police aggressively
enforced laws against social disorder with “zero toler-
ance,” requiring arrest for any law infraction.35 Low-
level offenses that required arrest under the policy
included graffiti, aggressive panhandling, fare beating,
public drunkenness, unlicensed vending, public drink-
ing, and public urination.
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Box 1
The Broken Windows Theory of Policing
Broken Windows theory has had an extraordinary influence on
American policing in the past two decades—in New York City and
many other cities. The theory, originated by Professors James Q.
Wilson and George Kelling, has also stimulated a body of aca-
demic writing on the subject of order maintenance.a
Because signs of physical and social disorder invite criminal
activity,b Wilson and Kelling argue, police should address minor
disorders to strengthen police–citizen interactions and promote
informal social control.b,c Disorder indicates to law-abiding citi-
zens that their neighborhoods are dangerous places, making
these citizens afraid to take an active role in promoting social
order in their communities and leading them to withdraw from
community life.d At some tipping point, the theory suggests, dis-
order trumps order by defeating the willingness of citizens to
interact with the police to promote security. Disorder invites more
disorder in a contagious process that progressively breaks down
community standards and ultimately invites criminal invasion.
Theories about how social norms work suggest that individuals
create norms of either legal or illegal behavior in their communi-
ties through interactions with others.e Broken Windows theory
calls for changing social norms in communities where crime is
pervasive, removing the cues of crime (such as vandalism, petty
theft, and loitering), and replacing those cues with alternative
cues that signal order and social regulation. Citizen–police collab-
oration is a critical element in the theory; citizens engage with
police to enforce norms of orderliness.f When police focus on
repairing or removing low-level disorder problems, Wilson and
Kelling argue, they combat crime by promoting social interactions
among law-abiding citizens; this, in turn, strengthens the dynam-
ics of social regulation that produce security and social control.g
a See, for example, Kelling, G.L. Order maintenance, the quality of urban life, and police: A line of argument. In Police leadership in America. W.A. Geller, ed. Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1985; Klockars, C.B. Order maintenance, the quality of urban life, and police: A different line of argument. In Police leadership in America. W.A. Geller, ed. West-
port, CT: Praeger, 1985; Klockars, C.B. Street justice: Some micro-moral reservations: Comment on Sykes. Justice Quarterly (December 1986) 3(4):513–16; Sykes, G.W.
Street justice: A moral defense of order maintenance policing. Justice Quarterly (December 1986) 3(4):497–512; Sykes, G.W. The myth of reform: The functional limits of
police accountability in a liberal society. Justice Quarterly (March 1985) 2(1):51–66; and Greene, J.R., and Taylor, R.B. Community-based policing and foot patrol: Issues
of theory and evaluation. In Community policing: Rhetoric or reality? J.R. Greene and S.D. Mastrofski, eds. New York: Praeger, 1988, pp. 195, 201–03.
b Wilson, J.Q., and Kelling, G.L. The police and neighborhood safety: Broken windows. Atlantic Monthly (1982) 249(3):29–38. Wilson and Kelling’s definition of “minor” disorder
includes such problems and crimes as littering, loitering, public drinking, panhandling, teenage fighting on street corners, and prostitution. Also mentioned are signs of
physical disorder, including abandoned cars (with broken windows, naturally) and dilapidated buildings (also with broken windows).
c Livingston, D. Police discretion and the quality of life in public places: Courts, communities, and the new policing. Columbia Law Review (1997) 97:551–672; Waldeck, S.E.
Cops, community policing, and the social norms approach to crime control: Should one make us more comfortable with the others? Georgia Law Review (2000)
34:1253–1310; and Harcourt, B.E. Reflecting on the subject: A critique of the social influence conception of deterrence, the broken windows theory, and order-mainte-
nance policing New York style. Michigan Law Review (1998) 97(2):291–356.
d See note no. 2, Wilson and Kelling, p. 33.
e Meares, T.L., and Kahan, D.M. Law and (norms of) order in the inner city. Law and Society Review (1998) 32(4):805–31. For an illustration based on ethnographic
research, see Anderson, E. Code of the streets. New York: Norton, 1999.
f See note no. 5, Meares and Kahan, p. 823.
g Ellickson, R.C. Controlling chronic misconduct in city spaces: Of panhandlers, skid rows, and public-space zoning. Yale Law Journal (1996) 105(5):1165–1248.
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This policy was very different from traditional notions of
community policing. Typically, community policing has
emphasized citizen–police collaboration to reduce social
disorder; avoidance of coercive encounters with citizens
on the street; and efforts to remedy physical disorder in
the community through activities such as cleaning up
trash-strewn lots, painting over graffiti, or correcting
code violations in buildings.36 Instead, the NYPD adopt-
ed a policy of aggressive stop-and-frisk practices. In prac-
tice, the policy evolved as gun-oriented policing based
on aggressive stops and searches of people suspected of
carrying guns illegally or committing even minor infrac-
tions.37,38 With nearly all increases in homicides, rob-
beries, and assaults during this period attributable to gun
violence, it is not surprising that the NYPD focused on
guns.37 (See the article by Blumstein in this journal
issue.) The homicide crisis was a critical theme in the
mayoral election campaign of 1993 and focused the
attention of the incoming Giuliani administration’s
crime-control policy on gun violence.39
This tactical shift toward aggressive stops and searches
departed sharply from the pristine version of Broken
Windows theory, as well as from the original version of
OMP and other models of community policing.40 As
originally conceptualized, OMP involved the enforce-
ment of community standards “through non-arrest
approaches—education, persuasion, counseling, and
ordering—so that arrest would only be resorted to
when other approaches failed.”41 New York City’s pol-
icy ultimately violated the principles of OMP in two
ways. First, the NYPD version of OMP rejected the
emphasis on alternatives to arrest and prosecution—
essential tenets of the theory.42 Second, community
standards were not identified through structured and
systematic interactions between police and community
leaders. Instead, the NYPD turned to a sophisticated
data-driven management accountability system to
identify community needs.
The focus on guns nudged OMP in New York City
into a pattern of racial policing. Because disorder is
more often prevalent in urban neighborhoods with
elevated rates of poverty and social fragmentation,43
OMP tactics were disproportionately concentrated in
minority neighborhoods, where disorder and crime
were conflated with poverty and socioeconomic disad-
vantage. Minority citizens thus widely perceived OMP
as racial policing or racial profiling.44 The fact that the
principal tactic was an aggressive form of stop-and-frisk
policing involving intrusive searches45 and that at least
two deaths of unarmed citizens of African descent were
linked to OMP46 further intensified perceptions of
racial animus.47
In other words, New York City’s implementation of
Broken Windows theory produced a style of racial
policing that stigmatized minority communities and
widened an already-troubling racial breach in the city.48
Although stop-and-frisk tactics most likely contributed
in part to the crime decline in New York City, their pre-
cise contribution is contested.49 But there also is little
doubt that there were social costs from the crackdown
on crime, which may have compromised the original
intent of Broken Windows theory: to rebuild social
norms against crime.31 As one researcher observed,
these efforts “have little to do with fixing broken win-
dows and much more to do with arresting window
breakers—or persons who look like they might break
windows, or...strangers...or outsiders.”50
Prosecution of Gun Offenders in Richmond
From time to time, federal prosecutors have pursued a
strategy of selective federalization of high-profile crimes
that otherwise would fall under state jurisdiction, using
the significant prosecutorial resources of the federal
branch to increase the likelihood of conviction and
lengthier sentences. One such effort, Project Exile, is
targeted at gun violence. Project Exile was conceived in
the late 1980s in the U.S. Attorney’s office encompass-
ing Richmond and the surrounding regions of Virginia.
Although the program in its original form was not tar-
geted specifically at youth, some communities have
adapted it to focus on youth. Project Exile has been
credited with declines in gun violence. It includes little
community involvement, however, which makes it dif-
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ficult for the program to change youth cultural norms
surrounding guns. Moreover, new studies suggest that
the program’s successes may have been overstated.
In Project Exile’s original form, all gun arrests made by
state and local authorities were prosecuted in federal
court under federal firearms statutes, which were more
stringent than state laws and allowed for longer prison
sentences.51 To increase its general deterrent effect,
Project Exile was implemented with “an innovative
community outreach and education initiative...to get
the message to criminals that illegal guns are unaccept-
able and will not be tolerated.”52
Both 2000 presidential candidates embraced Project
Exile, and politicians from both parties have endorsed
the program, lauding what they see as its successes.53
Indeed, the initial results of Project Exile seemed
impressive. Prosecutors obtained 59 indictments with-
in two weeks of launching the project,54 and firearms
seizures declined by 50% within three months.55 With-
in two years, 438 indictments had been obtained,52 and
Project Exile was associated with a 33% reduction in
the homicide rate over a two-year period.56 In 1999,
the Justice Department sought resources to expand
Project Exile in a limited way. Funds were allocated for
hiring federal prosecutors, but none of the other pro-
gram elements (such as outreach efforts to the com-
munity) were included.
Unfortunately, recent studies show that declines in gun
violence produced under Project Exile were no greater
than the general decline in gun violence throughout
U.S. cities during that time.57 The decline in Rich-
mond’s gun homicide rates represented a continuation
of the general downward trend in gun homicides in that
city during the years preceding Project Exile and was
not unusual compared to the declines in gun homicides
in other cities during the same years. Broad reductions
in gun violence were consistent in most of the nation’s
large cities during the late 1990s, regardless of whether
Project Exile or similar programs were in effect.
Despite mixed evidence of its impact, Project Exile has
inspired several other programs nationwide. Operation
Safe Neighborhoods (OSN) in Baltimore, for example,
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seeks to identify and prosecute high-risk individuals
involved in gun violence and gun trafficking.58 As in
Project Exile, the agencies involved in OSN have made
a concerted effort to directly “deliver this message”59 to
offenders. Community organizations and faith institu-
tions are involved to address conditions that give rise to
gun violence, a strategy similar to that used in Boston.
Prosecution, however, is clearly at the forefront of the
program. Like Project Exile, OSN is not specifically tar-
geted at juveniles.
Another program, the Youth Violence Handgun Ini-
tiative in Seattle, does focus on adolescents and uses
selective prosecution to address youth gun crime prob-
lems.60 Several studies suggest that prosecution became
more efficient under this initiative. Charges were filed
more quickly, case-processing time was reduced, and
conviction rates increased from 65% to 78%.61
Project Exile and similar programs make conscious
efforts to respond to gun violence problems with high-
ly visible and strong punishment and to deter would-
be youth gun offenders by communicating the high
odds that gun possession or gun crimes will evoke pun-
ishment. Prosecution does not address safety issues
that pervade the developmental ecology of adolescents
when gun violence is common in their communities,
however. (See the article by Garbarino, Bradshaw, and
Vorrasi in this journal issue.) Though such efforts may
ensure that justice is done to youth gun offenders, they
are not likely to change the scale of youth gun violence
or the presence of guns in youth culture significantly.
Deterrence messages often are trumped by danger on
the streets and the perception of teenagers that they
need to carry arms for their own safety.62, 63
Soft Legal Control: St. Louis, Detroit,
and New Haven
Some law enforcement agencies have tried to reduce
youth gun violence in their communities by emphasiz-
ing nonpunitive “soft” approaches, with arrest and
incarceration available as a last resort when other
approaches fail. Three cities—St. Louis, Detroit, and
New Haven—adopted innovative “soft” strategies to
address youth gun violence in the 1990s. Although
these strategies had mixed records at reducing youth
gun crime, they offer compelling visions for how police
can expand their toolkits when working with youth.
Consensual Gun Searches in St. Louis
The St. Louis Firearm Suppression Program (FSP)
incorporated the concepts of community involvement
from Chicago and Boston to develop a gun-oriented
policing policy that was precisely the opposite of the
policy in New York City.64 Operated by the St. Louis
Police Department, FSP was a “knock-and-talk” pro-
gram that elicited parental consent to enter homes to
search for and seize guns from juveniles.65
The program was straightforward. Responding to a
request from a parent, or a report from a neighbor,
FSP officers would visit the home and ask an adult res-
ident for permission to conduct a search for illegal
weapons. The officers would explain that the search
was intended solely to confiscate illegal firearms, par-
ticularly those belonging to juveniles, and that there
would be no criminal prosecution. A “Consent to
Search and Seize” form allowed police to enter the
home legally and conduct the search.66 Adult residents
also were told that they would not be charged with ille-
gal firearm possession if they signed the consent
form.66
As in Boston, Chicago, and San Diego, the St. Louis
effort reflected an analysis of youth gun violence prob-
lems by police in collaboration with the community.
Indeed, researchers have characterized the program as
“a response to problems identified by citizens.”66 How-
ever, citizens participated in a limited way in this exper-
iment, by consenting to police searches, in contrast to
the structured community interactions of citizens and
police in problem solving in other cities.
The St. Louis strategy differed from New York City’s
aggressive, order-maintenance policing strategy by nar-
rowly constructing targets and focusing efforts on well-
defined situations. By avoiding broad suspicion based on
crime demography, the St. Louis police minimized the
possibility of mistakenly targeting innocent people for
aggressive law enforcement. Moreover, the interaction of
police and citizens to produce a voluntary police inter-
vention incorporated elements of procedural fairness67—
including ethical and objective treatment—that
promoted trust and confidence in the law and legal actors
as well as higher rates of compliance with legal norms.68
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Some obvious questions arise about this “soft
approach”69 to gun-specific search and seizure. First,
the level of perceived coerciveness in these situations is
unclear. How voluntary is “consent” when police offi-
cers arrive at the door and ask permission to search the
home? Citizen refusals raise a related challenge. If
police respond to a refusal by obtaining a warrant and
conducting a nonconsensual search, the authenticity of
the “consensual” search is compromised.
Second, security and control may not directly increase
when neighbors are encouraged to “snitch” on each
other.70 Police–citizen interactions differ when a parent
invites the police to a home, compared to when a citi-
zen refers police to a neighbor’s home. The latter situ-
ation does little to knit social ties among neighbors and
may lead to counterproductive scenarios in which
neighbors accuse each other falsely or fail to come to
each other’s aid when crimes occur nearby.
Other challenges are implicit in the program. The
information provided to police is likely to vary in
authenticity, from poor (from jailhouse informants or
vindictive neighbors) to very good (from parents). The
balance of risks is delicate for police. If police act on
poor and inaccurate information, they risk negative
reaction from families that could undermine later
searches. If they reject information, they risk a gun
crime that might have been prevented.
Moreover, what rate of seizures per search will be
viewed as successful, compared to seizures resulting
from more coercive tactics? A low “hit rate” when
searches are voluntary may create internal pressure
either to increase coercion or to abandon the voluntary
component of searches. Finally, when juveniles lose
their guns, will they re-arm? This seems likely if broad-
er steps are not initiated to reduce the overall perceived
level of gun-related danger.63
The comparative advantage of voluntary searches is the
promise of citizen–police interaction to reduce gun
violence—a partnership that can have secondary bene-
fits for social control of youth crime. Complex opera-
tional questions challenge the program, however, and
it must operate in tension with police culture; non-
criminal justice alternatives work against a norm that
rewards police for the arrests they make.71 Evidently,
neither the program’s benefits in crime control nor its
internal support were sufficient to sustain it; the pro-
gram was disbanded in 1998, shortly after a new police
chief was named in St. Louis.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Young Gun 
Offenders in Detroit
Another effort to reduce gun violence among youth
built on the growing influence of therapeutic jurispru-
dence, or “treatment courts,” in American justice sys-
tems. A specialized court in Detroit tried to convince
juvenile gun offenders to put down their weapons. An
evaluation of the court found that it did change youth
attitudes toward guns, but that it led to little corre-
sponding behavioral change—partly because the spe-
cialized court did nothing to address dangers in the
community that led youth to feel they needed to carry
guns for protection.62
The typical treatment court works this way: Persons
charged with specific offenses consent to have charges
filed, then plead guilty or accept responsibility. The
defendant then accepts placement in a treatment pro-
gram in lieu of formal punishment. If progress in the
program is deemed satisfactory, charges are dropped or
the conviction is expunged; otherwise, the court may
choose a different service provider, often more inten-
sive and restrictive, or reinstate formal punishment.
The term therapeutic jurisprudence reflects the empha-
sis in these courts on behavioral change through treat-
ment interventions motivated and monitored within a
legal framework.72
This approach was applied to youth gun violence in a
specialized court in Detroit.62 Offenders charged with
possession of handguns were required to attend a four-
hour class held in the courtroom as a condition of pre-
trial release. Classes emphasized the dangers of
handguns and challenged participants to take personal
responsibility for reducing the negative consequences of
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gun possession. The program included dialogues with
the judge, focusing on culture and responsibility; slide
shows depicting murder victims; interactions with older
felons; and a “pledge” not to initiate gun violence.73
A randomized trial involving 446 subjects showed sig-
nificant and positive effects in a two-week follow-up,
including (1) weaker belief that guns afforded control in
threatening situations, (2) stronger belief that gun fights
could be avoided, (3) weaker support for gun use in
conflict situations, (4) weaker belief that guns afforded
positive social status, (5) stronger belief that ties should
be broken with peers who continued to carry or use
guns, (6) stronger support to avoid situations where
guns might be present, and (7) greater knowledge about
the risks of injury and death from gun use.73 These atti-
tudinal changes rarely translated into behavioral change,
however. In focus groups, many participants said that
everyday danger and fear motivated gun possession, gun
carrying, and at times, gun use.
Two lessons follow from this limited experience. First,
a specialized court for youth gun offenders might be an
effective forum to bring about cognitive and attitudi-
nal change. It is steeped in legitimacy, with a judge
whose personal involvement imbues the legal interac-
tion with moral authority. Messages that might other-
wise be dismissed may be taken seriously in this forum.
Second, however, the decisions of young persons to
carry weapons reflect their assessments of danger in
their lives. Policing and legal sanctions for gun violence
may be effective only when young people perceive that
a broader shift in norms is reducing the level of danger
in their communities and the motivation for gun use
that it evokes.
Mental Health Partnerships to Reduce 
the Trauma of Gun Violence in New Haven
The lethality of youth gun violence is compounded by
traumatic effects on bystanders, peers, and others caught
in its ecology of danger. When teens witness or experi-
ence violence, or see the aftermath of a violent act they
committed, the traumatic effects can adversely affect
development and shape how teens react in the future to
threatening situations.74 (See the article by Garbarino,
Bradshaw, and Vorrasi.) In New Haven, police and men-
tal health officials came together in an innovative collab-
oration to help children and youth cope with
gun-related trauma. The idea was to prevent future
youth violence by addressing trauma when it occurs.
Police are hard pressed to deal with trauma, even
though they have frequent contact with children
involved in shootings. Culturally, most police lack the
training to deal with the psychological aftermath of
gun violence, and the demands of their job rarely leave
time for sustained involvement. Police culture provides
little support for reacting therapeutically. In the worst
of circumstances, police involvement can aggravate
trauma rather than ameliorating it.
The Child Development–Community Policing Pro-
gram in New Haven, located at the Yale University
School of Medicine, incorporated principles of child
development and psychological functioning into the
everyday work of police officers.75 It also built institu-
tional linkages between police and mental health, inte-
grated community participation into police planning
and supervision, and altered police approaches in
encounters with children exposed to violence.
This process built on a strong platform of police–citi-
zen interaction, begun in 1991, that already had cred-
ibility and momentum in New Haven. Credible
relationships with citizens made possible police–citizen
interactions focused on problem solving, especially
where recurring violence and its traumatic components
were concerned.
The Yale University staff sought to shift social norms
among the police and mental health professionals by
offering fellowships to a 10-week seminar they created
for management and line staff from both fields. The
seminar was heavily experience-based, with case studies
that helped participants build a common language
about trauma and adolescence. The program also cre-
ated a consultation service to help officers who recog-
nized the need for intervention with traumatized
children and youth that they encountered. Police offi-
cers used their new clinical perspective to interact with
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schools to address truancy problems, and with child
welfare workers regarding placements for children
removed from their homes because of violence or neg-
lect. The integration of mental health perspectives into
police work, and the development of concrete ties
between police and mental health systems, had tangi-
ble payoffs for police and motivated openness to new
ways of approaching problems of youth violence.
Conclusion
Two critical questions remain about the efforts of the
cities described in this article. First, did these policing
innovations help reduce youth gun violence? Second,
what lessons do these experiences offer for future polic-
ing strategy, specifically in the context of adolescent
gun violence?
Analyses of gun violence rates in the nation’s 20
largest cities suggest few differences from one place to
the next in the patterns of gun violence since 1985.37
Even in cities such as Houston and Dallas, where no
specific policing innovations took place during this
time, gun violence rates rose and fell in roughly the
same pattern as in the cities described in this article. It
is not only fair but critical to ask, “How much do
police make a difference?”
Unfortunately, assessing the effectiveness of police
interventions regarding youth gun violence is difficult
at best. Efforts to understand how policy affects gun
violence will need to disentangle the competing and
overlapping effects of police interventions. Measures to
capture “dosages” of enforcement and social control
under different rubrics need to be developed. The role
of larger forces—such as the business cycle, large-scale
nationwide demographic shifts, declining drug mar-
kets, and rising rates of incarceration—must also be
considered seriously.76
These case studies do suggest that policing alone can-
not contain lethal youth violence. The challenge to
policing, then, is to contain the epidemic nature of gun
violence while promoting social control and regulation
to resist future waves of gun violence. Police actions are
not likely to stop the cycle of youth gun violence, but
their tactics can shape the history of that violence: how
long it persists, how serious it is at its peak, and
whether its aftermath hastens or forestalls future epi-
demics. Strategies that balance security, social control,
and legitimacy are essential to shift norms on a scale
that matches the prevalence of lethal youth violence.
The case studies also show the importance of focusing
police strategies on guns and gun violence, not just on
people. Police must incorporate procedural justice and
moral legitimacy in order to make their efforts salient
among youth and adults in communities burdened
with gun violence and promote the citizen-police
interactions that will produce security.
It is also crucial to recognize two specific contexts sur-
rounding youth gun violence that require thoughtful
approaches: adolescent development and the role of
race. First, youth gun violence reflects a crisis of ado-
lescent development in contexts of violence and dan-
ger.77 The complex role that gun violence plays in the
formation of social identity, and the behavioral scripts
that teens use to negotiate the challenges of everyday
life, must be considered in the design of strategies for
controlling gun violence.
Second, race is everywhere in this equation and must
be a factor in policing. Communities that suffer loss
and injury from gun violence are most often those that
are racially segregated and socially disadvantaged.
Policing in this social context requires sensitivity to
questions of legitimacy and procedural fairness. When
policing is perceived as externally imposed, casting a
broad net of guilt, and performed with little consent of
the citizens most affected, each interaction between
police and citizens can corrode the legitimacy of the
law and police. Each interaction also can motivate or
deter citizens from participating in the tasks of social
control. Reconfiguring criminal justice along lines of
legitimacy and proportional and procedural fairness
will benefit youth and adults alike and broaden the web
of social control to reduce the danger that guns pose to
children and youth in the United States.
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